It is not often remarked upon, but Descartes works from an intellectualized version of the Christian doctrine of sin (See, however, William J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism, 186). Whereas Christian thought tended to understand sin as the willful turning away from God and neighbor, Descartes defines it as the will's defection from what the mind understands (René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy [MM], 84). In turning away from the understanding, "we lead our thoughts along different paths" and thus arrive at an intolerable "diversity of opinions," this in spite of the fact that reason is naturally equal in all men (MM 1). But possession of a good mind is not enough if one does not apply it well.
This explains his conviction that in spite of the fact that the best minds of human history had worked in philosophy, "there is nothing in it about which there is not some dispute" (MM 5). Nor do those disputes arise only among the philosophers. Among the peoples of the world, customs and behaviors have "about as much diversity as I had previously found among the opinions of philosophers" (MM 6). And the church is not much help either; indeed, one could argue the church is Descartes' chief worry. The censure of Galileo clearly bothered him (MM 23, 34). And his description of the project by which he formulated a parallel world, resembling ours in every way but totally imaginary, seems like a deft maneuver specifically to avoid trouble with the theologians and "the learned" (MM 23-35).
So when Descartes speaks repeatedly of the intolerable diversity of opinions, indeed going so far as to note that "everyone is so very full of his own viewpoint, that it would be possible to find as many reformers (réformateurs) as heads" (MM 34), it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the skepticism informing arguments from both sides of the reformation debates is in view. While brilliant thinkers worked on both sides of the divide, they upturned the tables of human knowledge en route, leaving "nothing that is not doubtful" (MM 5).
This explains his conviction that in spite of the fact that the best minds of human history had worked in philosophy, "there is nothing in it about which there is not some dispute" (MM 5). Nor do those disputes arise only among the philosophers. Among the peoples of the world, customs and behaviors have "about as much diversity as I had previously found among the opinions of philosophers" (MM 6). And the church is not much help either; indeed, one could argue the church is Descartes' chief worry. The censure of Galileo clearly bothered him (MM 23, 34). And his description of the project by which he formulated a parallel world, resembling ours in every way but totally imaginary, seems like a deft maneuver specifically to avoid trouble with the theologians and "the learned" (MM 23-35).
So when Descartes speaks repeatedly of the intolerable diversity of opinions, indeed going so far as to note that "everyone is so very full of his own viewpoint, that it would be possible to find as many reformers (réformateurs) as heads" (MM 34), it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the skepticism informing arguments from both sides of the reformation debates is in view. While brilliant thinkers worked on both sides of the divide, they upturned the tables of human knowledge en route, leaving "nothing that is not doubtful" (MM 5).
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