Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Strangers as Means of Grace: Rublev and Genesis 18

About Rublev's icon of the Trinity, Florensky famously exclaimed “Rublev’s icon of the Trinity exists, therefore God exists.” But an intriguing characteristic of the icon is its insight as an interpretation of Genesis 18.

Probably in response to Genesis 18 (and its resumption later in Hebrews), the rule of Benedict states "let all guests be received like Christ." In a Benedictine Abbey, special kitchens are to be kept open for guests who arrive at irregular hours.  This commandment to hospitality finds an ancestor in the story of Abraham, who ran to meet three unexpected visitors from his tent door and to welcome (compel?) them into his house.  It is from him that the traditions of all his descendants “include injunctions to offer hospitality to the stranger.”   Abraham insists the three men allow him to wash their feet, and to serve them water and bread.  These practices echo all over the ancient world, recognizable as both honor for guests and expectation of good hosts.  Although practices may vary, the Abrahamic traditions all agree that Abraham’s example commits all those who claim his patrimony to the expression of hospitality to strangers.  And it is this hospitality that is dramatized in Rublev’s 14th century piece.

Let us venture a provisional definition of hospitality, because its popularity as a buzz word in a pluralistic context has allowed many kinds of slippage.  By the fact of the neighbor’s presence, we are sharers of space in which various goods are common to all:  “let a little water be brought, and wash your feet, and rest yourselves under a tree, while I fetch a morsel of bread.”  What those goods are may change over time and place.  But whatever the goods in common might be, the stranger lays claim to them for her own reasons.  Those reasons need not orient on any axis of values held by the host.  A great deal of listening will likely be necessary in order to identify what those goods in common are, but they are bound to be there.  When they are discovered, a good host will ensure that inasmuch as she is able, she procures the interests of the guest without determining for the guest the proper reasons for such goods.  To do all the good one can for one’s neighbor as that neighbor understands goodness:  this is the understanding of hospitality I will suggest.  Abraham recognizes the needs but implores the men and awaits the consent of their stopping at his house.  He then offers his guests the best from what he has, a choice, tender calf.  Abraham’s service to them is extravagant, what the New Testament would call latreia.  If we have any doubt about what the text means when it has Abraham call the men "lord" (Adonai), we are relieved of it by the slaying of a choice (Heb. twb) calf, exactly as would be prescribed by Torah’s own commands.  Rublev’s icon shows the three men at a table, with one of the men blessing a chalice in which is the head of a lamb.  While this is definitely Eucharistic imagery, hearkening to sacrifice of Christ enacted in the Lord’s Supper, the genius of Rublev’s account is that he shows that sacrifice via Abraham’s finest wealth, placed at the disposal of his guests, doing all the good he can.   And, importantly, there is no clear evidence in the text that Abraham knows the identity of the men to whom he offers his hospitality, at least until much later, when the men set out to perform judgment on Sodom and Abraham names them “Judge of all the earth.”  True, the Torah’s most common rationale for hospitality is that the Israelites were themselves aliens once (Ex. 22:21, Lev. 19:34, Deut. 10:19, et. al).  But Abraham serves whoever comes to him “as unto the Lord.”

By so doing, some have entertained angels unawares (Heb. 13:2):  Rublev captures the unawareness precisely in that he does not render what is inexpressible to word or image.  This is not exactly the Trinity.  It is, the text and his rendering show us, three men.  But it is also, the text tells us, somehow, an appearance of YHWH.  This indirectness is not typical of icons.  Indeed, this image is liable, insofar as it is called an icon of the Trinity, to tremendous theological misrepresentation.  The contents of this icon, read literally as a representation of God, would lead one not to Trinitarian faith but to tritheism.  Rublev forces the reader to remember, and never to stop remembering, that she is reading a visual representation of an Old Testament text!  And yet it is precisely so that the reader discovers the Triune God revealed there, for insofar as the story is one of Abraham’s wandering and Sarah’s barrenness (cf. Is. 40), of exiles surprised by God in the desert (Hosea 2), of tables set in the wilderness (Ps 23, Ps 78:19), the icon narrates the story of Israel.  And it positions, literally front and center, the sacrifice of the Passover Lamb, shared in the one chalice, as the focus to that entire history.  Again, this is not how icons of Christ typically work.  In the case of the Transfiguration, the crucifixion, or even the Pantokrator, all that the icon claims is seen in the face of the Son of God.  But here, we search in vain even for Christ.  Rather, we are given the history of God leading his people through the desert, providing for them in unexpected ways as they wander, both feeding them and feeding the world through them.  Within this story of Israel, a secret begins to make itself known, as the various symbols and motifs of Israel’s history coalesce around the table Rublev knows, from his privileged position on the receiving end of Israel’s history, to be set for God.  Which of these three does Abraham address by the singular “lord?”  It is dangerous to speculate, and Abraham’s actions do not differentiate.  Similarly, it is fruitless to differentiate practically
the “God” we serve from among the neighbors with whom Christians live, and when Christians work for the common good of those neighbors, they are making choice offerings to the Lord.

Following his source text, Rublev insists that nobody involved needs to recognize their work as an offering for that to be in fact what it is.  There are dangerous consequences to this, since failure to serve the neighbor would by Rubev’s logic be a sin against God.  Indeed, it is exactly the straw of bad hospitality that breaks the camel’s back in Genesis 19, occasioning the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.  Thus, hospitality precedes fruitful engagement with others not merely for pragmatic reasons, but because there is simply no way to know whom we are receiving, or whom we deny.  This is not to say, however, that there are no benefits to be realized.  Indeed, working to procure for our neighbors the goods common to us both will likely win a measure of trust that allows conversations to begin and continue (this will be explored below).  Rather, it is to insist that whether or not such benefits materialize, Abraham’s children are committed to be hospitable for higher reasons.  The stranger is a means of grace for us in that she places a vital check on our desire to gather for ourselves alone, and in so doing, she compels us to live lives of offering to the God in whom, as Augustine reminds us, we love our neighbor.  Rublev shows us nothing if not that.

In its respect for these boundaries, then, hospitality represents one (all too rare) way of dealing with the logic of election, to which all of Abraham’s children are in some way or other committed.  Scripture and history alike testify to the danger that election represents among sinful people.  So often, and so easily, election justifies us/them dynamics that allow unspeakable acts of violence and destruction.  For many in the 21st century, language of election is inherently to be avoided.  They see election as the religious enshrinement of the native fear and mistrust of strangers.  And it must be conceded that such fears are justified, for example, when one considers Sarah’s hostility and abuse of Hagar.  The world can be a fearful place, and often it seems as if religious beliefs merely ossify those fears and baptize fight and flight responses.  But the stranger in the midst of Abraham’s community turns out, unexpectedly, to be the bearer of the promise of Abraham’s favor in the eyes of God.  God’s actions for the elect, we learn, are precisely to deliver them from fear.  Terrorism and “wars of religion” are not inherent to the logic of election but opposed to it, in that they stem from the fear for the security of one’s election.  It is the person secure in her status before God who can be hospitable (cf. Gen. 13, where Abraham gives Lot first choice).  It is exactly our fears about the truth of our election that the other in our midst mercifully forces upon us, and invites us to commit to God for healing.

Rublev keeps the story’s principal characters (at least in the telling of Genesis) off the screen.  Abraham stands by a tree, and Sarah, Genesis tells us, is in the tent laboring over preparations for these guests.  But their presence with her forces the question on which the whole election is poised:  “after I have grown old, and my husband is old, shall I have pleasure?” (Gen. 18:12).  The claim to revelation in the mouth of the stranger, in unexpected and unpredictable ways, forces insecurity to arise and shakes Sarah's faith.  The neighbor’s presence unsettles our confidence, and we are compelled to make an account of the other in our midst.  In this light, Sarah’s laugh cannot be passed over, for it is exactly here that she is making this account of the men, processing the complex logic of election and struggling with the difficulty revelation forces upon her, demanding faith and absolute loyalty to what seems ridiculous.  The laugh is a nervous dismissal of the other's claim to her trust, which explains why she is later ashamed of it.  The sheer difference of the stranger strains credibility and threatens her worldview. Yes, it is Israel that carries the election, but that can only be because Sarah herself carries it.  The questions the strangers force are not questions about election generically but about Sarah’s own barren womb and the blessing soon to come from it.  There is no doubt that this announcement, good news though it may be, in fact merely added pressure where pain was already felt.  How much resentment at the hebel hebelim of her life was expressed in that laugh!

Rublev keeps these elements of the story both present and held carefully in the background.  The tree and the house, Abraham and Sarah, remain in back of the cold, unearthly gazes shared by his three figures.  They stare inexplicably in a circle, at one another, unflinchingly held within an embrace they alone share.  Our ways are not their ways, and their thoughts are not our thoughts.  To receive them, to wash their feet and serve them food, is to acknowledge oneself as an outsider.  It is to respect a boundary one cannot cross.  Abraham and Sarah disappear from view like table waiters:  the first family of Israel reduced to such a position.  These three men are unabashedly the center of the story Rublev is telling.  To sit with them is to sit away from them, and to recognize the reality of one’s own otherness.  It is to allow the searching gazes to call us radically into question.  On what basis dare we call ourselves children of Abraham? It is uncomfortable, and if one takes Rublev seriously that this is a window into God, fear is not at all out of the question!

Again, Rublev’s icon, it must be remembered, is an icon of three men, that is, three human beings.  They are communicating God to us, but not in some other way than as the strangers that visited Abraham.  Insofar as we look at them, we cannot help but see God, but we cannot at all identify them as God.  As Rowan Williams observes, “We have granted that this is not a 'picture' of the Trinity in any ordinary way, and that the three figures are not straightforwardly portraits of the three divine persons; rather we are looking into and following the path of the divine process of dealing with us to reveal and save.”   That path and process, as has already been said, is the story of Israel’s election, finding its fulfillment in the crucified Lamb whose blood seals the New Covenant.  These strangers, unsettling as they are, do indeed bring us good news of God’s welcome issued to us and to all.  And if we are willing to seek in the contours of their strangeness the message of God, if we are willing to sit at this table and brave our inevitable anxieties as they come upon us, then we are permitted, unthinkably, to remain at this table.  “She has chosen the good portion, and she shall not be deprived of it” (Lk 10:42).  As has been noted by many of Rublev’s readers, the fourth seat at this table belongs to the one who views it.  We become the other in the midst of the other, enabled to “go with them on their way” (v. 16), and to be the presence that (potentially) brings the other to a crisis.  “Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?”  We become the representative to the people we have hosted, now the guest among them, calling them into question:  “shall not the judge of all the earth do right? (Gen. 18:25).  And this mutual act of calling of one another into question, ensconced in a mutual welcome and the assurance that we will do all the good for one another we can, even at high cost to ourselves, simply is what agape will look like in a pluralistic context.  Not only this:  it is what it means for Christians to give faithful witness to the world in a way that does not blind them to what surprise God might be speaking to them through the outsiders among whom they live.  To the degree that this does not occur, it is because of flinching responses to the realities that press in upon us, through the uneasy presence of the other.  That is, Christian witness is hampered by a failure to recognize (heremeneuō) the stranger as a means of grace, as Christ present to us in disguise, drawing us into fuller recognition of the miracle of a people chosen for God.

All of this means that Rublev’s icon is hermeneutically significant.  It is a way of helping Christians discern the voice of God speaking in the complexities of the Old Testament and, thus, of the world.  Natalie Van Kirk observes how Christian images in the early and medieval church were meant to train the eye to see God.  The evacuation of images from much worship, she argues, has had detrimental effects probably unintended by those who removed them, for “even those of us who do not think we are using images are indeed surrounded by them, and when the images with which we surround ourselves contradict the words that we speak or read, we are in great danger of creating such cognitive dissonance that the entire message becomes incomprehensible.”   This claim has resonance with an earlier one that failing to show hospitality to the stranger in our midst is dangerous, because of just whom we might be failing to serve.  Similarly, if we do not allow our image of the other to be disciplined by God, our fear will not hesitate to produce a caricature.  And God forbid we should see the finger of God and name it as the work of darkness (Mt. 12:26-32)!  Jesus’ words on this score are utterly unsettling:  “They will also answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty…?’  He will reply, “truly I tell you, ‘whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me’” (Mt. 25:44-45).

Rublev’s icon insists that under no circumstances can love of God be divorced from love of neighbor.  Instructed by it, the observer allows the form of Abraham’s guests to discipline her vision, such that she finds every other stranger she meets to be the image of these three.  And this of course is the point, Biblically speaking.  A Trinitarian theology of hospitality sees the other in light of the fact that God is our guest and we are His.  For all Abraham’s many faults, he is tenacious and desperate to know the Lord, so much so that he offers his best animal at the faintest chance that the stranger will turn out to be the veiled face of God.  The Benedictines expect God in the guise of a guest, because, like Rublev, they know whose table they serve.  They know that servers at this table drink from the Passover Chalice whose wine quenches all thirst.  Rublev’s three men, for all their Trinitarian echoes, are only echoes.  But the thing to which they witness, the slain Lamb in the center of the table, focuses the icon and interprets it.  In the end, the only icon can be the crucified body of Jesus the Stranger, raised up for the world’s deliverance.  Icons train us to discern that blessed body and to love what we see.  For to love Christ is to love God and neighbor at one time.  Rublev’s icon, then, like all good Trinitarian theology, contains an entire Weltanschauung.  He understands everything that is to depend for its existence on God in Christ, through whose body and blood we are drawn in to the witnessing community and empowered by the Holy Spirit.  In that community, God heals the alienation that makes us strangers to each other and ourselves.  His power removes our corruption, makes us images of God for one another, and through us orients all creation towards a table where He is Giver, Guest, and Gift.  At that table, no man will teach his neighbor, saying “know the Lord,” for they shall all know Him, from the least to the greatest.  Small wonder then that this mere sketch of the Lord’s Table, prepared in the wilderness, had the great Florensky lost in Alleluias.

Monday, September 22, 2014

Of Walls and Wailing: Psalm 80

"All who pass by (עָבַר) do pluck," wails the Psalmist, because "you have broken down our wall." In Psalm 80, God's action is the apparent problem. He has "fed them with bread of tears," "given them bowls of tears to drink," "made us derision."

The problem about all of this, for the Psalmist, is its incongruence with the salvation God had already achieved.

גֶּ֭פֶן מִמִּצְרַ֣יִם תַּסִּ֑יעַ תְּגָרֵ֥שׁ גּ֝וֹיִ֗ם וַתִּטָּעֶֽהָ׃
   פִּנִּ֥יתָ לְפָנֶ֑יהָ וַתַּשְׁרֵ֥שׁ שָׁ֝רָשֶׁ֗יהָ וַתְּמַלֵּא־אָֽרֶץ׃
כָּסּ֣וּ הָרִ֣ים צִלָּ֑הּ וַ֝עֲנָפֶ֗יהָ אַֽרְזֵי־אֵֽל׃
   תְּשַׁלַּ֣ח קְצִירֶ֣הָ עַד־יָ֑ם וְאֶל־נָ֝הָ֗ר יֽוֹנְקוֹתֶֽיהָ׃

God is the farmer who has tilled and prepared ground, who has removed rocks and weeds, who has planted Israel. God is the one who made it fill the land, who allowed the mountainous wasteland to be "covered" (כסה) by its shadow. And it is God who has stretched out Israel's shoots from the River to the Sea. What farmer would do that only to uproot and destroy? What farmer would invest in a crop only to see the harvest stolen by thieves?

For all these reasons, however, the transition to v. 12 is arresting. While the entire Psalm has focused on the agency of God in both planting and uprooting Israel, the wall of v. 12 (גָּדֵר) does not have God as its builder. God's intent was to stretch out Israel from river to shore, to grow them up into a nation in whom the nations could find shelter. It was God's plan that in Israel the nations would find the "cover" the original pair found for their nakedness in the garden and that the blessed find for their sins (Ps. 32:1).

The plan was always that Israel's grapes would be harvested by the foreigner (וְ֝אָר֗וּהָ כָּל־עֹ֥בְרֵי—cp. Lev. 19:10), that the nations would find shelter in a bountiful and generous Israel.

Such plans cannot help but be hindered by the construction of a wall.

But the wisdom of Israel's God consists in this: that the hard hand of divine discipline is merely the gracious pull further up and further in to Israel's deliverance.



Monday, September 15, 2014

Poem--an episode from the novel I'm at work on

Cheated by thirst at the rivulet's dry edge,
Pack dogs suffer August.  They do not suffer
The she-horse, shielding her keep of a pond,
To go unrivalled.  Nor does she yield—to yield

Is to die with O2 still in the lungs.
Their scent affronts propriety and nerve.
Who abides this?  The alpha charger snaps
In two at the force of a back-flung foot.

Another two withstood, wracked carcasses,
Less bloody than she when I found her moments after.
She was my father's, till he ran her off
For taking no saddle in trade of grain or trough!             
    

Meaning Is Use, but Not How You Think

Richard Braithwaite gave the 9th annual Eddington lecture 19 years after A.J. Ayer had ejected all religious language, so Ayer thought, off the field of meaning. For Braithwaite, there are chinks in the positivist armor (most notably with regard to moral speech). He concedes to the positivists that religious language fails the test of empirical observation, hypothesis, and analytic entailment. But he denies that failure against this criterion implies failure of meaning. Moral statements, for example, seem to have meaning beyond either assertion of fact or expression of taste: they can compel us. The force of this objection, Braithwaite notes, has caused subsequent thinkers either to fudge on "verification" or on "meaning"; Braithwaite does the latter, adapting a doctrine of Wittgenstein's to argue that if use guarantees meaning then the meaning of a statement "is given by the way in which it is used." Nor does this move, he insists, constitute a defection from empiricism. In fact, an empiricist discovers how a word is used by way of "empirical inquiry" alone. 


What exactly is the moral sense of this?
And that use, he argues, is moral; religious statements encrypt a kind of morality. To make way for this thesis, Braithwaite first examines the nature of moral language. So-called "emotive theories of ethics," like that proposed by Ayer, describe apparent moral assertions as mere expressions of taste; they evince rather than assert. Yet that way of characterizing such language, Braithwaite argues, fails to account for the fact that often people assert to be right a course of action for which they feel no special regard. For him, "no emotion of feeling of approval is fundamental to the use of moral assertions." Instead, moral assertions are used as expressions of intent to behave in a certain way. "What is primary is intention." In this way, Braithwaite thinks he has rescued religious belief for an age of scientific advance.  
 

Braithwaite's suggestions are brilliant. By focusing on the moral sense of Christian language, he thinks he can solve the empirical puzzle and leave Christian practice more or less intact. It is true, that is, that Christian theologians have thought both that Scripture and the Rule of faith tell a story with intense moral implications. And it is also true, or was in Braithwaite's place and time, that most people tend to have a moral compass that is oriented in pretty much the same way. 

But can we really ground moral language itself—let alone coded moral language—in the way Braithwaite thinks we can? For one thing, if we evaluate the statement "x is right" as a cipher for "I intend x," and the latter statement is indexed to a moral system in which "x" is held to be right, have we really broken free of the Verificationist trap? It seems that the move merely circles back to a claim that is either morally significant because it claims some truth about right and wrong behavior or we have let it borrow its significance from an intention that itself borrows meaning from a system of right behavior. I do not see how we can avoid either a claim to some kind of truth or an infinite regress. And if this is true of moral language, it seems just as true of his mirroring move with respect to religious claims. If religious language, such as "I believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God" is really a code for "I intend to live my life agapeistically," and if that latter statement only finds its specifically Christian character with reference to the Christian story, it seems we are not yet free of deciding whether the statement "I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ..." has its own meaning. I suspect that clever Verificationists would view this entire program as so much handwaving, demonstrating even more clearly that we can arrive at a basically moral society without reference to all of these complicated religious systems.

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

A Brief Primer on Anglican Spirituality

"How good it is to center down":  so Howard Thurman begins his meditation on navigating the inward sea, retreating from the disorder and urgency of the everyday and finding the stillness at the soul's center.  He remarks on the difficulty of this for most people, the way we are besieged by the exigencies of life in the world and prevented from the moment in which we address God and find ourselves addressed.  Without that moment, it is difficult to know oneself, and so many of us go along in the world deaf to our own summons to appear before and as a part of the whole of creation in its response to its created givenness.  The creation seethes with wonder and joy in the grace that makes it exist at all.  But the paradox of humanity is we are conscious of the contingency of our own being, capable of observing and receiving the miracle that all things are, yet we are hardened somehow to it:  we are ever seeing and never perceiving. 
            
For almost as long as there have been humans, there have been people who noted this paradox, both lamenting it and attempting to redress it.  There is a family resemblance in all of these traditions, namely, a conviction that human consciousness must be trained to see what is there all the time to be seen.  The ancient Mediterranean philosophers promoted philosophy as a whole way of life, in which the mind was disciplined into seeing the ordering principle of being, the ratio or logos that everywhere surges within it.  The ancient Hebrews were commanded to enact a dramatic rehearsal of the events whereby YHWH had entered the creation.  Hindus have prayed and sought the blessings of the Devas for millennia, and Buddhists have engaged in ritual practices of detachment in order to purify the sight to perceive the absolute that negates all the world's seeming. 
            
My own Anglican tradition, itself heavily influenced by the practices of Benedictine Catholicism, retains and develops elements of all of these in the conviction that the truly living person is the person whose life sways in rhythmic and unceasing prayer; for Anglicans, prayer is inhaled like oxygen in the form of Scripture, and exhaled as expression of gratitude for the nourishment received.  We gather at morning and at evening to hear the Scripture read and to pray, in the confidence that we will both address God and hear God's address to us, in call and response, to grow in the knowledge and love of God.  As the Scripture is read, we grasp and hold onto the word as it speaks to us, turning it in our vision, allowing it to shine in a plurality of facets, reflecting the divine light this way and that, and in this light we come to see ourselves as those who are loved by God precisely in God's gift of divine speech to us.  We hear the Old Testament and the New Testament, as the promise and memory of the mystery at the heart of all existence, the mystery that is expressed most clearly as God's speech to us in the person of Christ, the logos that binds the Scripture and the world together.  This address challenges our own claim to see the world rightly; and our vision is retrained. 
            
We confess ourselves humbled by that address and respond in the prayers, both written and spontaneous, in the recognition both that our times require a response that is unique and also that only those who have been taught to speak can make such a response.  In our speech, we present ourselves to God as those who have been addressed and who have assumed the responsibility to appear as we are before God.  We ask for divine power to turn us more and more into people whose lives in the world make clear that God has spoken to the world in Christ and has summoned the world to the divine service.  At morning and at evening, there is both the call and the response, each time dramatizing the events that, so we claim, have created and redeemed the universe.  God has spoken, and creation has appeared.  God has delivered Jesus over for our redemption, and we have appeared before God as friends. 
            
Additionally, through the year, this pattern of address and response is inflected by the events not only in the life of Christ (Advent, Christmas, Epiphany, Life, Passion, Death, Resurrection and Exaltation) but in the life of the Church which is his body (the days of the Apostles, Prophets, and Saints).  In these inflections, we rehearse the life of Jesus over the course of the year as the event that founds our redeemed existence.  And in these rehearsals we are reconstituted as those whose center is not a vacant stillness but a perpetual offering of self in obedient self-denying love before God.  And this center's ordering principle is the prevenient gift of God in Christ, reconciling humans to God even when they were enemies. 
            
The Benedictine heritage that lives on in the Anglican prayer tradition bequeathes to it also the individual discipline of Lectio Divina, in which the movements found in Anglican common prayer are keyed to the individual in her own private encounter with God.  The Scripture is read, meditated upon, and then returned to God as private prayer and contemplation of the life God has given.  The unique flavor of Benedictine spirituality, however, is that it is only individual in a complementary sense; our primary spiritual practice is a corporate one, reflecting the inherent sociality of human being.  We are summoned to a corporate response to God in reflection, contemplation, and common action.  In this sociality, we come to know ourselves in the gaze of others, from whom we receive affirmation of our own being as gift. 
            
This rather abstract description of the practices of "Anglicanism" is surely a bit idiosyncratic, and it does not really name my spiritual practice; but that is because, in a real sense, no spiritual practice that I am a part of is mine except in the sense that it belongs to Anglicans as a whole.  We are a called out people, and while God's address spares no expense to speak to my heart, it speaks to my heart as it is actually constituted, by relationship to that which is external to me.  There is no me that is not always already me in relation, me in response to that which is not me. 

            



Thus, a life of common prayer disciplines my vision, weaning me off of a kind of preoccupation with myself, with the inner theater in which I differentiate between what is mine and what is not mine.  But in this differentiation I am choking my own response to the givenness of everything that is, the reality of God's gracious gift to me of everything I think is mine.  And in this way, the paradox of humanity that Thurman observes in our captivity to the urgent is the fruit of the desire to acquire and to make mine what can never actually be mine.  What do I have that I have not received?  The Benedictine disciplines preserved in the Anglican Prayer Book traditions challenge my presumption that anything belongs exclusively to me, that even my words are really my own.  And in so doing, it opens my eyes to the utter grace of being and of all beings; I am compelled to say of being what God has said of it, namely that it is "good."  And I am compelled to act against the evil within it by offering myself in response to God's voice as it echoes in the prayers of those around me, of my neighbors.  In this way, the so-called vita activa, the active life in which I participate in the demands of life, is reordered as a lived prayer.  My own captivity to the urgent becomes (gradually and fitfully) an offering of myself to the needs of others, in the recognition that at least sometimes the word they speak to me is an address from God.

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

I know that I am, therefore I think I know when I know

William Abraham wonders if René Descartes isn't "a kind of particularist." In an engaging classroom debate recently, Abraham offered a critique of common ways of reading Descartes (including his own) and a new and intriguing reading of the Pater Philosophiae. 

Descartes, so the common reading goes, was after a sure and certain method with which to attain all knowledge. In his discourse on Method, he outlines a rigorous multi-step process for breaking down problems of knowledge. First, and most important, he decides to doubt whatever he thinks he can possibly get away with doubting (in an earlier post, I attempted to place this aim into a suitable historical frame). Second, he tries to divide every problem possible into smaller problems. Third, he aims to let truths that are easier to know control the more difficult ones. And fourth, take good notes!

From these, Descartes goes on to try out the world. In the end, he finds he can doubt the truth of basically everything--the world, his senses, even mathematics and the existence of God. At last, however, he finds that he cannot be talked out of his belief in his own existence, since even attempting to doubt it would entail himself as the one doubting. It is therefore, he concludes, clearly and distinctly true that he exists.

Now the standard reading is that from here, Descartes goes on to build a house of knowledge, piling truth on truth, line on line, precept on precept. The only problem with this reading is that it isn't true. To be sure, Descartes has a method for knowing what can be known, and he does in fact follow it. But it is worth observing that no criterion of truth controls his first conclusion. Indeed, he gets first to what he thinks he can know, and from that knowledge constructs a criterion of knowledge that can withstand the radical methodological doubt. And the next truth that he tries to discover does not follow from the first truth which follows from a prior criterion; rather,  it follows ad-hoc in an order of questioning. And the truth of what he thinks he finds is grounded not on prior truths but on the way he thinks he knows those prior truths.

The question is whether knowledge in the first instance depends upon a criterion established before the fact or whether what he knows sets the terms. The second reading seems more plausible, and, so it seems, describes particularism. On this reading, one would have to understand his "method" to mean something like a consistent mode of inquiry rather than a strict commitment to deductive reasoning.  And his third postulate would mean not (or not necessarily) that simple truths can be used to derive harder ones, but that they can establish how we think we know, and from how we know those truths we can guess at what point we would decide harder truths had become known to us. And in this sense, he is surely a methodist, but perhaps also "a kind of particularist."